Abstract-Signcryption can realize the function of encryption and signature in a reasonable logic step, which can lower computational costs and communication overheads. In 2008, Fagen Li et al. proposed an efficient secure id-based threshold signcryption scheme. The authors declared that their scheme had the attributes of confidentiality and unforgeability in the random oracle model. In this paper, we show that scheme is insecure against malicious attackers and give our attacker method to forge the ciphertext. Following our method, any malicious attacker can forge a valid message in their scheme. Further, we propose a probably-secure improved scheme to correct the vulnerable and give the unforgeability and confidentiality of our improved scheme under the existing security assumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Encryption and signature are the two basic cryptographic tools offered by public key cryptography for achieving confidentiality and authentication. Signcryption can realize the function of encryption and signature in a reasonable logic step which is proposed by ZHENG [1] in 1997. Comparing to the traditional way of signature then encryption or encryption then signature, signcryption can lower the computational costs and communication overheads. As a result, a number of signcryption schemes [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]were proposed following ZHENG's work. The security notion for signcryption was first formally defined in 2002 by Baek et al. [9] against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack and adaptive chosen message attack. The same as signature and encryption, signcryption meets the attributes of confidentiality and unforgeability as well.
In 1984, A.Shamir [10] introduced identity-based public key cryptosystem, in which a user's public key can be calculated from his identity and defined hash function, while the user's private key can be calculated by a trusted party called Private Key Generator (PKG). The identity can be any binary string, such as an email address and needn't to be authenticated by the certification authentication. As a result, the identity-based public key cryptosystem simplifies the program of key management to the conventional public key infrastructure. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [11] found bilinear pairings positive in cryptography and proposed the first practical identitybased encryption protocol using bilinear pairings. Soon, many identity-based [12] [14] [15] [16] and other relational [13] [17] [18] schemes were proposed and the bilinear pairings became important tools in constructing identitybased protocols.
Group-oriented cryptography [19] was introduced by Desmedt in 1987. Elaborating on this concept, Desmedt and Frankel [20] proposed a (t, n) threshold signature scheme based RSA system [21] . In such a (t,n) threshold signature scheme, any to out of n signers in the group can collaboratively sign messages on behalf of the group for sharing the signing capability.
Identity-based signcryption schemes combine the advantages of identity-based public key cryptosystem and Signcryption. The first identity-based threshold signature scheme was proposed by Baek and Zheng [22] in 2004. Then Duan et al. proposed an identity-based threshold signcryption scheme [23] in the same year by combining the concepts of identity based threshold signature and encryption together. However, in Duan et al.'s scheme, the master-key of the PKG is distributed to a number of other PKGs, which creates a bottleneck on the PKGs. In 2005, Peng and Li proposed an identity-based threshold signcryption scheme [24] based on Libert and Quisquater's identity-based signcryption scheme [25] . However, Peng and Li's scheme dose not provide the forward security. In 2008, another scheme [26] was proposed by Fagen Li et al., which is more efficient comparing to previous scheme.
In this paper, we show that the threshold signcryption scheme of Fagen Li et al. is vulnerable if the attacker can replaces the group public key or even the attacker can intercept the intermediate messages. Further, we propose a probably-secure improved scheme to correct the vulnerable and give the unforgeability and confidentiality of our improved scheme under the existing security assumption.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Bilinear pairing
Let 1
G be a cyclic additive group generated by P, whose order is a prime q, and 2 G be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a map 
C. Security notions for identity-based Threshold signcryption
The notion of semantic security of public key encryption was extended to identity-based signcryption scheme by Malone-Lee [27] . This was later modified by Sherman et al. [28] which incorporates indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext and identity attacks (IND-IDTSC-CCA2) and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message and identity attacks (EUF-IDTSC). We describe below the security notions for confidentiality and unforgeability given in [29] , this is the strongest security notion for this problem. , , ,
Confidentiality
identity A ID and a receiver Bob with identity B ID . Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG chooses groups 1 G and 2 G of prime order q (with 1 G additive and 2 G multiplicative), a generator P of 1 G , a bilinear map
and hash functions 
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IV. CRYPTANALYSIS OF FAGEN LI'S ID-BASED THRESHOLD SIGNCRYPTION SCHEME
A. Forgery attack
Suppose that an attacker can control the communication channel, which means that she can gain each user's corresponding ciphertext in the channel and modify or forge it to replace the original one. Then she will try to disrupt the scheme as follows:
All the attack process will be finished in the Signcrypt stage. We describe it as follows: 
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VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF OUR IMPROVED SCHEME
In this section, we will give a formal proof on Unforgeability and Confidentiality of our scheme under CDH problem and DBDH problem.
Theorem 1 (Unforgeability): Our improved scheme is secure against chosen message attack under the random oracle model if CDH problem is hard.
Proof: Suppose the challenger C wants to solve the CDH problem. That is, given ( , ) aP bP , C should computes abP . C chooses system parameters { } 
Signcrypt query: If C receives a query about Signcrypt with message i m , identity i ID
and compute
4. Return ( , ) . So C can solve the BDDH problem.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we show that the threshold signcryption scheme of Fagen Li et al. is vulnerable if the attacker can replaces the group public key. Then we point out that the receiver uses the senders' public key without any verification in the unsigncrypt stage cause this attack. Further, we propose a probably-secure improved scheme to correct the vulnerable and give the unforgeability and confidentiality of our improved scheme under the existing security assumption. 
